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Article 8

OPEN COURT
THE NEED FOR REVISION OF NORTH CAROLINA LIEN LAWS
The Statutes of North Carolina relating to Mechanics', Laborers'
and Material Furnishers' Liens are in a state of serious confusion

in some respects. By reason of the importance of the subject with
relation to the rights and property interests of contractors and material furnishers and owing to the tremendous growth and progress in
construction work and building operations in North Carolina, there
is a present need for a revision of the Statutes and a redrafting of
the lien laws with a view to removing the apparent conflicts and
contradictions therein existing and the doubt and uncertainty in the
minds of the members of the legal profession in their efforts to advise their clients intelligently. In fact, it would seem that there is
need and reason for uniform laws in the different states governing
and controlling the rights of contractors and material furnishers who
are constantly engaged in inter-state operations under contracts for
construction work involving large sums of money. 1 At the present
time there is no uniformity in these laws and the rights of these contractors are necessarily based upon the varying statutes of the different states. In some of the states all contractors, sub-contractors,
and material furnishers share pro rata in the property which is the
subject of their lien, in others their priority is based upon the date
of the filing of the notice of their lien and in others priority is based,
upon the time when the work was commenced or the material begun
to be furnished. Another question, and one which at times becomes
very important in determining and adjusting the conflicting claims
of such creditors, is whether a lien attaches to an entire tract of land
upon a part of which improvements have been made or buildings
constructed, for example where the owner has developed a tract or
parcel of land and sub-divided the same and built on a relatively
small portion thereof a large and costly building.
In discussing these questions it must be borne in mind that the
liens of contractors, sub-contractors, laborers, and material furnishers, are statutory only, and in determining who is entitled to a lien,
'A Uniform Mechanics' Lien Act has been prepared and was presented to
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at their meeting in Seattle, July,.
1928.
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and for what and the extent and priority of the same and upon what
the same attaches, the statutes of the state must be examined and
relied upon.
I
Priority of Lien-What Determines.
The origin of the lien laws of North Carolina is contained in the
Public Acts of the Legislature of 1868-69, Chapter 117, entitled
"An Act to create a Mechanics' and Laborers' Lien Law." The
material and pertinenit provisions of that Act as bearing upon the
2
questions herein discussed are quoted in the note.
It will be noted that there is nothing in this act prescribing or
declaring when the lien attaches to the property or that it attaches
thereto as of the date of the commencement of the labor or the
furnishing of the material.
The next legislation relating to this subject, is Chapter 206 of the
Public Laws of 1869-70, entitled "An Act for the protection of
Mechanics and other Laborers, Materials, etc.," the material and
pertinent provisions of which are recited in the note below. 3

'Section 1. In what cases a lien may be enacted:

1. A lien may be and is hereby created under the provisions of this act in
the following cases; Where any person performs any labor in erecting, altering
or repairing any vessel, house, building or appurtenances thereto.
2. Where any person furnishes any material for erecting, altering, or repairing any vessel, house, building or appurtenances thereto.
Section 2. On what the lien shall attach:
The lien hereby created, on filing the notice hereinafter provided for, shall
attach for the value of such labor or materials upon such vessel, house, building
or appurtenances, and upon the lot, parcel or farm of land, upon which such
house, building or appurtenances shall stand, or upon which such crop shall be
made and secured, to the extent of the right, title and interest of persons contracting for such labor, or for the furnishing of such material, or his heirs
or assignee.
Section 3 provides that the notice of lien herein provided shall be filed with
the Clerk of the Township Board of Trustees where the claimant's demand
does not exceed $200.00, or with the Register of Deeds where the demand

exceeds that amount.

Section 4 provides that this notice shall be filed within thirty (30) days
after the performance and completion of the labor and of the final furnishing

of the materials.

Section 5 provides the requisites of the notice of the liens.
Section 7 prescribes the proceedings to enforce the lien.
Section 11, is in the following words:
"The liens created and established by this act shall be paid and settled
according to, the priority of the notice of lien filed."
'Section 1. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA
do enact, That every building built, rebuilt, repaired or improved, together with
the necessary lots on which said building may be situated, and every lot, farm
or vessel or any kind of property not herein enumerated shall be subject to a
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It will be observed that Section 2 of this Act establishes as the
time when a lien attaches to the property, the time of the commencement of the work or the furnishing of the material and this is an
important change in the law as it existed theretofore.
The first decision of the Supreme Court of this State establishing
the principle that a lien upon land for labor performed and material
furnished relates back to the time when the labor and materials
4
were begun to be performed or furnished, is Chadbournv. Willians.

This seems to be the leading case in North Carolina on this proposition and has been cited with approval from that time up to the
present, having been first followed in the case of Burr v. Maultsbyu
which is cited in the later cases.
The statute which was in force at the time of the commencement
of the furnishing of material in the case of Chadbourn v. Williams,
was the Act of 1868-69, and the Statute which was in force at the
time of the filing of the lien was the Act of 1869-70, and the question
arose as to which of these two acts governed or was applicable. The
court held that:
"By a fair construction of both, the lien begins from the time
-when the materials were begun to be furnished. The filing of notice
relates back to that time. This is expressly enacted by the Act of
1869-70, chap. 206, sec. 2, and we think it follows from the provisions of the Act of 1868-69."
By a comparison of Chap. 206 of Public Acts 1869-70, above
quoted, with the sections of the Consolidated Statutes in effect today,
it will appear that there has been a radical change in the law during
the interval of time which has elapsed. Section 1782 of the Code of
1883, which cites the Act of 1869-70, Chap. 206, Sec. 2 (quoted verlien for the payment of all debts contracted for work done on the same or
material furnished.
Section 2. The lien for work on crops or farms or materials given by this
act shall be preferred to every other lien or incumbrance which attached upon
the property subsequent to the time at which the work was commenced or the
materials were furnished.
Section 4 provides that claims under $200.00 may be filed in the office of
the nearest Magistrate; if over $200.00 in the office of the Superior Court
Clerk.

Section 6. That nothing contained in this act shall be construed to affect
the rights of any person to whom any debt may be due for any work done
which priority of claims filed with the proper officer.
Section 9. That all laws or parts of laws coming in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.
"Chadbourn v. Williams, 71 N. C. 444.
'Burr v. Maultsby, 99 N. C. 262.
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batim above), is identical with that section, it having been brought
forward in its exact words.
The Revisal of 1905, which was adopted as a single act by the
Legislature of 1905, brings forward Section 2 of Chapter 206 of
1869-70, and sec. 1782 of the Code, in an amended form, in section
2034 of the Revisal of 1905. This section is as follows:
2034. Laborer's Lien on Crops. The lien for work on crops
given by this chapter shall be preferred to every other lien or encumbrances which attached to the crops subsequent to the time at which
the work was commenced.
It will at once be seen that in the enactment of the Revisal of
1905, the lien theretofore given by the Act of 1869-70, the Code, sec.
1782, is restricted to work on crops, the words "or farms or materials" and the words "or the materials were furnished" having been
entirely stricken out, and this notwithstanding the fact that section
1782 of the Code and the Act of 1869-70, Chap. 206, Sec. 2 are
expressly cited.
The case of Burr v. Maultsby was decided in 1888 and this case
is cited as a leading case by the later decisions of the court.0
It would seem, therefore, that the court, in following the case of
Chadbourn v. Williams, supra, has been inadvertent to the repeal in
1905 of the provisions in the original statute as to material furnished.
The Act of 1868-69, the Code, Section 1792, the Revisal of 1905,
Section 2035, and Consolidated Statutes, Section 2471, are identical
in one respect; they contain the following provision:
"The liens created and established by this chapter shall be paid
and settled according to the priority of the notice of the lien filed."
The effect of this provision, which has been the law without
change continuously since 1869, is in direct conflict with the principle decided by the court in the cases hereinbefore cited and upon
the statutes hereinbefore mentioned, for the reason that under one
law priority of lien would be based upon the time of the commencement of the performance of labor or furnishing of material, whereas,
by the other it would depend upon the date of the filing of the notice
of the lien in the office of the Clerk of the Court or Justice of the
Peace.
'Burr v. Maultsby, 99 N. C. 262, cited in Lumber Co. v. Hotel Co., 109 N.
C. 658; Clark v. Edwards, 119 N. C. 115; Cheeseborough v. Sanatorium, 134

N. C. 245; McAdams v. Trust Co., 167 N. C. 494; Granite Co. v. Bank, 172 N.
C. 354; Porter v. Case, 187 N. C. 629; Harris v. Cheshire, 189 N. C. 219.
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There is no decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, so
far as the writer has been able to ascertain, upon a thorough examination of the Supreme Court Reports, in which this question of apparent conflict has been presented to the court. The question becomes
one of great importance as between material furnishers who have
entered into contracts with the owner direct, and not with a subcontractor, and who have filed notices of liens in regular form and
in accordance with the requirements of the statutes and who have
brought suits under the statute to enforce their liens. These claimants are not "sub-contractors" within the meaning of the word as
used in the lien statutes, in as much as their contracts are not with
the general contractor but, as heretofore stated, were executed by
and between them and the owner direct. Under this state of facts
they are entitled to liens as "material furnishers" and are not restricted, in the enforcement of their liens, to the fund in the hands
of the owner remaining due to the contractor under the provisions
of the lien statutes relating to sub-contractors, which will be hereafter discussed. Suppose one of these material furnishers obtained
judgment in his suit to enforce his lien, in which the Court decrees
that the plaintiff is entitled to a lien upon the property and that this
lien attached thereto as of the date when the plaintiff first began to
furnish material; and the Court has a right to make this decree under
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the state. Suppose again
that one or more or all of the other material furnishers obtained
judgments in their suits to enforce their liens with a like decree in
their judgments declaring their liens to attach to the same property
as of the date of the first commencement of the furnishing of materials in the various cases. Suppose that the plaintiffs in these cases
commenced to furnish material at different times, then the priority
of their liens, as declared in the judgments, is based upon the date
when they first commenced to furnish material. In direct contradiction of this conclusion and principle, is the express provision of
Section 2471 of the Consolidated Statutes, which, as we have seen,
is a part of the original Acts of 1868-69 and 1869-70, and is also
Section 2035 of the Revisal of 1905, which have been preserved and
brought down to the present time unchanged and in their original
phraseology, and which is in these plain and unambiguous words:
"The liens created and established by.this chapter shall be paid and
settled according to the priority of the notice of the lien filed with
the Justice or the Clerk."
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As proof of the intention of the lawmakers and of the meaning
,of the lien statutes with respect to the propositions above discussed,
attention is called to Section 2477 of the Consolidated Statutes which
prescribes the form and nature of the execution to be issued upon a
judgment rendered in an action brought to enforce a lien. This section is in the following words: "Upon judgment rendered in favor
of the claimant, an execution for the collection and enforcement
thereof shall issue in the same manner as upon other judgments in
actions arising on contracts for the recovery of money only, except
that the execution shall direct the officer to sell the right, title, and
interest which the owner had in the premises or the crops thereon,
at the time of filing notice of the lien, before such execution shall
extend to the general property of the defendant." If, as between
lien creditors, their liens attached to the property as of the time of
the commencement of the labor or furnishing of material, and if the
judgment of the Court so declared, then it would seem to follow as a
necessary consequence that the execution theron must direct the
officer to sell the right, title, and interest which the owner had in the
premises at the time the lien attached thereto as declared by the
judgment, to-wit, the time of the commencement of the labor or the
furnishing of the material. But Section 2477 of the Consolidated
Statutes, on the contrary, prescribes that the officer shall sell such
right, title, and interest which the owner had in the premises at the
time of filing notice of the lien. It is contended by some that the
principle that the lien attaches as of the time of the commencement
of the furnishing of material, operates and applies only as between
the claimant of the lien and the owner of the property and fixes that
date so as to prevent the owner from conveying the property to a
third person and thereby defeating the lien claimant of his rights;
but that as between lien claimants themselves priority is established
by the date of the filing of their respective liens in the Court. But
the statute does not so declare and the matter is left in doubt for that
reason. The same question that arises upon the above quoted section
of the Consolidated Statutes in respect to the form of the execution
to be issued upon such a judgment was squarely presented to the
Supreme Court in the case of Burr v. Maultsby,7 in which the Court,
in approving Chadbourn v. William-s,8 says: "It must be clear that
unless the claim when filed has relation back to the commencement
'Burr v. Maultsby, 99 N. C. 262.
' Chadbourn v. Williams, 71 N. C. 444.
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of the furnishing the materials, the object of the Act would be liable
to be defeated at the pleasure of the vendee of the materials by his
selling or mortgaging his estate. The Act would be idle and inefficacious against the very mischief it was intended to prevent." This
is quoted by the Court from the opinion in the case of Chadbourn v.
Williams. The opinion then quotes the statute relating to executions
(the Code, Sec. 1791, Consolidated Statutes, Sec. 2477) and proceeds
as follows: "On the argument it was contended for the defendants
that J. A. Maultsby & Son, had no 'right, title, and interest' to the
land in question 'at the time of the filing of the notice of the lien,'
to be sold, and as the statute just recited directed such interest to be
sold, this went to prove that the Legislature did not intend that the
lien should relate back to the time it arose. This argument is not
sound. The lien prevailed continuously next after it arose, and J. A.
Maultsby & Son, who then had title to the land, could not divest
themselves of it, except subject to the lien. So there was 'right,
title, and interest' in them to be sold as contemplated by the statute."
The Court then continues, as follows: "The same Statute (the
Code, Sec. 1782) further provides that 'the lien for work on crops
or farms or materials, given by this chapter, shall be preferred to
every other lien or encumbrance which attaches to the property subsequent to the time at which the work was commenced or materials
furnished'."
This last quoted provision of the law has, as has been hereinbefore shown, been amended by striking out the words "or materials"
and the words "or materials furnished" by the Revisal of 1905. It
will be seen from the opinion of the Court in the case of Burr v.
Maultsby, and the case of Chadbourn v. Williants, that the principle
therein declared, and since then uniformly approved and followed
by the Court, was based upon the statute which is quoted in full in
these decisions, and this statute having been repealed so far as it
applies to materials furnished, the decisions of the Court to that effect
no longer have statutory sanction. At no time has the Court decided
that as between the owner and the lien claimant the lien operates
from the time of the commencement of labor or furnishing the
materials, while as between lien claimants themselves, the lien is
operative and effective from the date of the filing thereof as is contended by some members of the profession. The questions discussed
in this article recently arose in litigation involving large claims of
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material furnishers aggregating hundreds of thousands of dollars in
the construction of a million dollar hotel, which was uncompleted
owing to financial difficulties of the owner. A contractor who had
done road construction work upon the premises, filed his lien in
which he set out the date of the commencement of performance of
labor and furnishing of material, which was before any work commenced upon the hotel, or any contracts were entered into for construction of the same. He obtained judgment by default against the
owner in which the Court decreed that his lien attached and became
effective as of the alleged date of the commencement of the performance of labor and furnishing of material by him. An execution
was issued upon his judgment directing the officer to sell all the
right, title, and interest, which the owner had in the lands at the
time of the commencement of the performance of labor and the furnishing of material by the contractor. The sheriff advertised the
land for sale.under the execution and at the sale the contractor was
the only bidder and became the purchaser at the bid and price of
$1000.00, and received a deed from the sheriff conveying property
worth five or six hundred thousand dollars. Other contractors and
material furnishers had filed their liens in the office of the Clerk of
the Superior Court prior to the date of the filing of his lien by the
contractor above mentioned. They were not made parties to the
suit brought by that contractor for the enforcement of his lien, and
naturally claim that they were not bound by the judgment in that
case. It will be noted that the execution under which the sale was
made and the deed executed and delivered, did not direct the officer
to sell the right, title, and interest in the lands which the owner had,
"at the time of the filing of the lien" by the plaintiff, as required by
Section 2471 of the Consolidated Statutes. Whether that section
was intentionally disregarded or the plaintiff followed the decision
of the Court in Burr v. Maultsby, the point involved in this litigation
has not been presented to the Supreme Court, and owing to circumstances which have since arisen, there is a strong probability that it
will not be presented. But by reason of the large interests which
were involved in the litigation and the possibility of these questions
again arising hereafter, the legal profession is interested in having
them settled either by a judicial interpretation of the Lien Statutes
by the Supreme Court or by legislation.
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The only decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in
which Section 2471 of the Consolidated Statutes is discussed in respect to its possible conflict with other portions of that law is the
case of Morganton Mfg. Co. v. Anderson and Crews9 (and in passing it is well to observe that while the defendant's name appears in
the title of the case in the Supreme Court Report as "Andrews," in
the statement of the facts by the Court it appears as "Anderson").
But, upon a careful reading of this case it will at once be seen that
the decision does not reach the question of conflict which is being
discussed herein. In that case the opinion of the Court, which gives
a history of the lien laws of the state, as bearing upon the question
involved therein, decides there is no conflict between Sections 2437,
2438, 2439, 2440, 2441 and 2442 of the Consolidated Statutes (Public Laws 1880, Chap. 44), which gives sub-contractors and laborers
who furnish labor or material a lien when notice thereof shall be
given to the owner, and Section 2471 of the Consolidated Statutes
which establishes priority according to priority of the notice of the
filing with the Justice or the Clerk. In this case the parties whose
rights were involved were in the strict sense of the word "sub-contractors," whose contracts were with the contractor and not with the
owner and who had given the owner notice of their claims, and it
was admitted that the owner owed the contractor a balance under the
contract at the time of the filing of their notices. The Court decided
that the funds in the hands of the owner due the contractor should
be distributed pro rata among the sub-contractors and denied the
contention of the party who first filed notice of his claim with the
Clerk of the Court, that he was entitled under 2471 of the Consolidated Statutes to a priority of lien and should be first paid out of
the fund on hand, the Court holding that the right of the sub-contractor created by Sections 2437 to 2442 of the Consolidated Statutes
was acquired by notice to the owner and that Section 2441 of the
Consolidated Statutes (Section 2022 of the Revisal of 1905) provides that the sums due shall be a lien "without any lien being filed
with the Clerk of the Court or Justice of the Peace," and that the
section of the statute declaring priority according to the date of
filing with the Clerk or Justice of the Peace does not relate to nor
affect the provisions as to sub-contractors who acquire a lien by notice to the owner.
'Morganton Mfg. Co. v. Anderson and Crews, 165 N. C. 285.
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In this connection it will be noted that the provision of the Lien
Law granting liens in favor of sub-contractors upon their giving
notice to the owner was not a part of the original lien laws of the
state as contained in the Acts of 1868-69, and 1869-70, but was
enacted by Chapter 44, Special Session of 1880 and Chapter 67 of
the Session of 1887, and this legislation was enacted as a consequence
of the decision of the Supreme Court in Wilkie v. Bray,O that no
right to a lien was conferred by the statute unless there was a contract, express or implied, with the owner, creating the relation of
creditor and debtor, and as a result sub-contractors were excluded
from its benefits because they had no express contract with the
owner, and none could be implied from the use of the materials as
they were furnished to the contractor, and under the express contract between him and the owner.'
As hereinbefore stated, the leading cases of Chadbourn v. Williams,'2 and Burr v. Maultsby,13 have been approved and followed
without question since the change in the statute made by the Revisal
of 1905, by a long line of decisions and the principle therein declared,
that the labor and material furnishers' lien attached to the property
as of the time of the commencement of the performance of the labor,
or the furnishing of the material, and is superior to any other lien
or encumbrance attaching subsequently thereto, has become thoroughly established as the law in the case notwithstanding the fact
that in 1905 the portion of the statute upon which these decisions
are based had been repealed. In the case of Burr v. Maultsby, supra,
the Court held that the lien when filed thus relating back to the time
of the commencement of the performance of labor or the furnishing
of material, is superior to and has priority over a mortgage given
by the owner upon the property subsequently thereto, but recorded
before the filing of the notice of the lien in the Clerk's Office. This
14
decision has been followed and approved in many cases.
"Wilkie v. Bray, 71 N. C. 205.
"Wilkie v. Bray, 71 N. C. 205; Mfg. Co. v. Anderson, 165 N. C. 285.
" Chadbourn v. Williams, 71 N. C. 444.
"Burr v. Maultsby, 99 N. C. 263.
"McAdams v. Trust Co., 167 N. C. 494; Cox v. Lighting Co., 152 N. C.
164; Moore v. Industrial Co., 139 N. C. 304; Electric Co. v. Power Co., 122
N. C. 599; Harris v. Cheshire, 189 N. C. 219.
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II.
Upon What Does Lien Attach?
The question which arises upon this phase of the Lien Laws is
illustrated, as stated at the beginning of this article, by the subdivision of a large tract of land into lots and the construction of a
hotel building upon a small portion of the property. The pertinent
provisions of the statute (C.S. Sec. 2433) are as follows:
"Every building built, re-built, repaired, or improved, together with
the necessary lots on which such building is situated, and every lot,
farm or vessel, or any kind of property, real or personal, not herein
enumerated, shall be subject to a lien for the payment of all debts
contracted for work done on the same, or material furnished."
The question at once arises what are "the necessary lots on which
said building is situated"? Suppose the building is situated in a
sub-division and as the central point and chief consideration and
inducement for the sale of the lots comprising the sub-division.
Does the Act mean that only the lots immediately surrounding the
building and necessary for the support and proper use of the building are the subject of a lien, and if so, how many lots and what is
the limit of their extent in distance from the building?
There is only one decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina remotely bearing upon this question, and this is the case of
Broyhill v. Gaither,15 in which the Court decided that where a house
is built -by a contractor for the owner upon an undivided tract of 80
acres in the county, the mechanics' lien attached to the whole tract,
even though the house and improvements are enclosed by a fence
including about three acres, especially where it appears that the
house alone, apart from the tract of land, would be of comparatively
little value; and that the enclosing of the house by the fence is not
a segregation of the house from the tract so as to confine the mechanics' lien to the enclosure. It is also held that although the lien
attaches to the whole tract, it should be divided, if practicable and
desired by the defendant, in making sale, and the parts sold in such
order as he may elect, so that, if possible, the lien may be discharged
without exhausting the entire tract. In no other case has this question been presented to the Supreme Court and it would seem that
the statute should be made more specific so as to state clearly the
Broyhill v. Gaither, 119 N. C. 443.
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extent to which the lien attaches upon lots or a tract of land. The
Court has decided that the lien attached 'to a lease-hold interest in
real estate10 and also to the franchise of a corporation."1
The last mentioned cases construe the meaning of the words of
the statute "or any kind of property, real or personal, not herein
enumerated."
Another application of the principle is where road or street construction is performed. Does the lien attach to the lots or portion
of land directly abutting upon the street or road, or, upon the theory
which underlies the whole lien law and furnishes the reason for
conferring a lien, to-wit, the beneficial improvement of property by
the labor and materials 'placed thereon in the construction work, does
the lien attach upon all the lots or the whole tract of land? An
entire sub-division of real estate is benefitted -by improved roads or
streets and should not the whole bear the burden of a lien, to be
satisfied by sale of only such parts or lots as may be necessary?
The rules and provisions of law relating to this question differ
according to the wording of the statutes of the different states and
this situation again illustrates the need for uniformity in these
statutes.
Wm. B. SNow.
Asheville, N. C.
REPLIES SHOW

TREN OF

THINKING ON PROPOSED

LEGAL CHANGES*

The National Economic League publishes a journal called the
Consensus. The number for June, 1928, Vol. XIII, No. 1, is devoted
to a report on a questionnaire submitted to its Special Committee
on the Administration of Justice, comprising 103 members, ninetenths of whom are lawyers or judges, living in thirty-eight states.
In a preliminary report made by the committee there was an analysis
of causes for dissatisfaction with the administration of justice and
consideration of proposed remedies. The committee came to the
conclusion that no panacea exists. It adds:
The main points to which we should address ourselves appear to
be: (1) Proper training of the legal profession; (2) giving the bar
greater influence in the selection of judges so as to insure expert
"8Wood Working Co. v. Southwick, 119 N. C. 611.
" Pipe Co. v. Howland, 111 N. C. 615.
* Reprinted from 12 JoURNAL or T E AmEmIcAx JuDIcATURE Soc=rY 120

(December, 1928).

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
qualifications in those who are to perform an expert's function; (3)
unification of the judicial system and more effective and responsible
control of judicial and administrative business; (4) giving power to
the courts to make rules of procedure and thus giving to the courts
power to do what we require of them. [There are two other points
not wholly germane to judicial administration. Ed.]
Questions were submitted under twenty headings in the field we
are interested in. The Consensus not only presents the votes on the
numerous questions but also comments by members of the committee too lengthy to be quoted. It may be said, however, that while
the personnel of the committee is exceptionally high, the gratuitous
comments frequently indicate a misunderstanding of the full scope
of the question. A hurried consideration by a hurried man is the
obvious explanation. A lack of understanding of the needs of the
judiciary in large centers also appears in the comments of some
members whose experience is restricted to a happier environment.
No attempt will be made here to assay the opinions expressed
by the majority votes. One thing however deserves attention, and
that is that the result of such a questionnaire submitted no more
than five or six years ago would have been quite different. There
are a number of special and rather searching questions answered
with intelligence by both friends and opponents at this time which
would, five years ago, have bounded off from -walls of prejudice or
ignorance. The voting is especially significant for the proof it displays of progress in formulating a broad programme of judicial
reform.
1. Judicial Council-Question: Should there be a permanent
judicial council in your state, the duty of which should be to make a
continuous study of the organization, procedure and practice of the
courts, and to report from time to time to the governor or legislature
upon the work of the various 'branches of the judicial system, with
recommendations for their improvements? Yes 60. No 6.
1. (a) Powers of Judicial Council-Question: Should such a
judicial council be given any further powers? Yes 17. No 25.
Thbse voting affirmatively were requested to suggest what further powers should be granted. The making of procedural rules
had more supporters than any other power proposal. General administrative powers were favored by several. The equalization of
the work of judges was offered, including assignment of trial judges
to relieve congestion in appellate courts. One member suggested
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the "recommendation of appellate judges for appointment." The
tendency of the proposals submitted was toward superintendence of
the business and rule-making of the judicial system, although a majority preferred to confer on the council only advisory powers.
2.' Selection of Judges-Question: Should judges of the states
courts, in your state, be
(a) appointed? Yes 40.
(b) elected? Yes 19.
Those favoring appointment gave 37 votes for the governor as
appointing officer, 2 votes for the supreme court, 1 for the chief
justice, 1 for the governor from a list recommended by the supreme
court and 1 for the governor on recommendation of the bar association.
Those favoring election stood, for popular election 19; for election
by the legislature 2; for a non-partisan and separate ballot, yes, 15,
no, 3. The comment under this question indicates a good deal of
prayer and heart searching as well as home experience. A trend
toward bar participation in the selective function appears and one
member proposes that the governor should appoint from a list of
eligibles made up by the supreme court.
3. Tenure of Judicial Office-Question: Should the term of
office be
(a) for life, during good behavior? Yes 32.
The vote as to a definite age for retirement stood: yes 24, no 8.
The age seventy was preferred by most voters as retirement age.
(b) For a term of years? Yes 29.
Seven favored 10 years, 4 wanted 8 to 10 years, 4 wanted 4 to 6
years and the scattering votes ranged from 7 to 20 years.
4. Court Unification-Question:Should the whole judicial power
of your state be unified and vested in one state organization, of which
all judicial tribunals should be branches or departments or divisions?
Yes 49. No 14. (a) Should there be specialized branches of the courts with
specialist judges in the larger cities? Yes 45. No 12.
5. Organization of Court Clerks-Question: Should the organization of the administrative and clerical side of the courts, in your
state, be prescribed
(a) by each court? Yes 20.
(b) by the highest court? Yes 25.
(c) by the legislature? Yes 6.
(d) by a judicial council? Yes 21.
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The voting again shows an encouraging trend toward viewing
the judicial council as the correct source of administrative power,
not only in respect to such judicial administration as directing the
activities of judges upon various calendars, but also in respect to
regulation of the servants of the judicial establishment. But the
comments indicate a very hazy notion of the question on the part
of some, notwithstanding there was a lengthy note of explanation.
6. Regulation of Procedure-Question:Should all rules of practice and procedure in your state be determined
(a) by each court? Yes 9.
(b) by the highest court? Yes 36.
(c) by the legislature? Yes 5.
(d) by a judicial council? Yes 21.
It is interesting to observe that faith in the legislatures as ruleprescribing bodies is approaching the vanishing point among men of
the sort serving on this committee; also, that the drift toward use
of the judicial council is rapid, for no council has yet received this
power and until two or three years ago there were few proponents
for this idea.
7. Power of Trial Judge-Question:Should trial judges in your
state, in instructing the jury, have power to sum up the evidence
orally, to comment upon its weight and sufficiency and upon the
credibility of witnesses as in Federal Courts?
(a) in civil cases ? Yes 54. No 8.
(b) in criminal cases? Yes 47. No 11.
8. Rule to Save Remanding-Question: Should the courts of
appeal be allowed, in their discretion, to receive new evidence or have
it taken, to make new findings of fact, to enter final judgment based
on such evidence and finding and thus to avoid remanding for a new
trial
(a) in civil cases ? Yes 26. No 20.
(b) in criminal cases? Yes 29. No 28.
9. Waiver of Jury Trial-Question: Should the defendant in a
criminal case have the right to waive jury trial and be tried by court?
Yes 55. No 8.
(a) Would you except death or life imprisonment cases?
Yes 16. No 37.
1. Would you advocate three judges in such trials?
Yes 32. No 16.
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10. Examination of Respondent--Question: Should the defendant in a criminal case be required to take the witness stand and submit to examination and cross-examination? Yes 23. No 40.
(a) If not required, should comment upon his failure to take
the stand be allowed? Yes 38. No 17.
11. Less Than Unanimous Verdict-Question: Should less than
twelve of a jury be able to return a verdict
(a) in civil cases? Yes 59. No 6. Thirty-two favored
a verdict by a majority of nine jurors.
(b) in criminal cases? Yes 41. No 21. Nine jurors again
received a higher vote than any other number.
1. Would you except cases involving death penalty or
life imprisonment? Yes 17. No 24.
12. Jury in Misdemeanor Cases-Question: Should a jury of
less than twelve be used in misdemeanor cases? Yes 50. No 9. The
number six was strongly preferred over any other.
13. Insanity as Defense-Question: Should the question of the
mental capacity of a person to be tried for a crime be taken out of
the forensic field and determined by a disinterested body of experts?
Yes 42. No 14.
(a) Should the question of irresponsibility because of mental
disease or defect be determined
1. by the court? Yes 39. No 6.
2. by the jury? Yes 14. No 18.
14. Official Organizationof Bar-Question: Should the entire
bar of each state have an official organization with compulsory membership, annual dues, and powers of self-discipline, subject to judicial
review? Yes 33. No 22.
Among the comments were two from widely separated states.
The Illinois member said: "Debatable. Experiment now being tried
in California." The California member said: "This is the California
system, which though but recently adopted, appears to be working
out most satisfactorily."
15. Requirements for Bar Admission-Question: Should two
years of college work outside of a law school and three years of law
school work, as recommended by the American Bar Association, be
exacted for admission to the bar? Yes 46. No 14.
(a) Should there be an examination on character and fitness
as well as on knowledge of rules of law? Yes 58. No 1.
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('b) Should there be educational requirements other than
knowledge of law? Yes 52. No 5.
The comment under all the headings is interesting, often persuasive and sometimes amusing. An opponent to educational tests for
applicants to the bar says that the one advocated by the American
Bar Association would have kept Lincoln out of the profession. It
is obviously not intended to mean that such requirements would have
kept Lincoln out of the profession in Illinois in 1836, because such
requirements had never been suggested, or even thought of at that
time, one reason being that there were no law schools to give three
years of tuition. The member evidently means that if Lincoln were
today of the right age to study law he would be kept from the
profession. Of course nobody can say what would happen if conditions non-existent are assumed, but the gentleman might at least be
more kind to the memory of one -who possessed the genius, the intellect and the persistence to gain first rank among the lawyers of the
Middle West, as well as to dabble in public affairs. Possibly the
discouragement experienced -by Lincoln in reaching the bar served
the purpose of keeping weaklings out, but they cannot be reintroduced at this time, when requirements of some sort are imperative,
because there appear to be several applicants for every place the
profession affords.
16. Prosecuting Officers-Question: Should district attorneys
and other prosecuting officers, in your state, except attorneys general
(a) be appointed? Yes 33. Twenty-one favor appointment
by the governor and seven appointment by judges.
(b) be elected? Yes 27. Twenty-four favor popular election.
(c) be subject to removal? Yes 48. No 5. Nineteen favor
removal by the governor, ten by the courts and the 15
votes are scattered among several agencies.
The seventeenth and eighteenth questions pertain to legislative
reference bureaus and the adoption of uniform state laws.
19. Grand Juries-Question:Should prosecution by indictment
be abolished and all criminal proceedings be initiated by information? Yes 24. No 35.
This query is most ineptly put, since there is no proposal that
indictment by a grand jury should be "abolished." Escape is sought
only in routine cases from the useless and wasteful procedure of the
grand jury. The comment shows that if properly worded the affirmative vote would have been much stronger.

OPEN COURT
(a) If grand juries are retained, should every accused person
be called and given an opportunity to face his accuser
and defend himself ? Yes 17. No 34.
It seems strange that seventeen of the country's leading lawyers
and judges should vote yes on this proposal. Such a proceeding
would be only another kind of preliminary examination, subject to
pitfalls for the state, and substituting a large number of inexpert
persons to do the work which should be done by one responsible
judge. It may be, however, that the few members of the committee
who are not members of the bar "plumped" for this trick question.
20. Civil Prosecutions-Question:Should not many violations
of law now called crimes and involving a criminal record, but punishable only 'by fines, be converted by statute into civil offenses involving
liability to the state without criminal record? Yes 48. No 10.
A long step in this direction can be taken by merely permitting
the use of a summons instead of a warrant of arrest, in the option
of the court or the officer making service.
21. Public Defenders-Question: Should there be legislation in
your state providing for public defenders? Yes 32. No 27.
CENSORING THE "TALKIES"

The legislatures must constantly amend their laws if the moral
bulwarks they purport to provide are to withstand the scientific
mechanical progress of the twentieth century. When the Pennsylvania legislators in 1915 laid down the law that a board of censors
"shall examine or supervise the examination of all films, reels or
views to be exhibited or used in Pennsylvania; and shall approve all
such films, reels or views which are moral and proper; and shall
disapprove such as are sacrilegious, obscene, indecent or immoral, or
such as tend in the judgment of the board to debase and corrupt
morals" they did not foresee the coming of the vitaphone and the
movietone. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly and cannot
be extended to cover situations which did not exist when the act was
passed and which the framers of the act could not have had in contemplation; so a Pennsylvania court holds that the Board of Censors
has no jurisdiction to require that spoken language used in connection with films be submitted to it for approval, In re Fox Film Corporation, 11 Pa. D. & C. 129, 85 Leg. Intell. 982 (Phila. C. P. 1928.)
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North Carolina has no censorship statute. Virginia which has a
statute identical with that of New York, seems to be the only state
1
in the southeastern division of states which has a Board of Censors.
The Virginia act, like that of Pennsylvania, requires the submission
only of motion picture film. Maryland and Kansas have very similar
statutes. 2 Should the question of censoring the "talkies" arise under
any of these statutes in their present form, it would seem that the
same construction would have to be given.
1 Michie's Va. Code Ann. (1924), §585 (15) ; Cahill's Consol. N. Y. Laws
(1923), p. 2468.
"Bagley Ann. Code Md. (1924) Art. 66a 1f2; Ks. Rev. Stat. (1923) Ch. 51103. The Kansas act is broader than the others in that it provides for censorship of advertising on the screen but it does not deal with spoken words.

